Estimating the Impact of Restructuring on Electricity Generation Efficiency: The Case of the Indian Thermal Power Sector by Kabir Malik et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF RESTRUCTURING ON ELECTRICITY GENERATION EFFICIENCY:











We thank Resources for the Future, the World Bank Research Board and the KCP Trust Fund for research
support and John Besant-Jones for helpful comments. The findings and conclusions of this paper are
those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank and its affiliated
organizations, the Executive Directors of the World Bank, the governments they represent, or the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2011 by Maureen L. Cropper, Alexander Limonov, Kabir Malik, and Anoop Singh. All rights reserved.
Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided
that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Estimating the Impact of Restructuring on Electricity Generation Efficiency: The Case of
the Indian Thermal Power Sector
Maureen L. Cropper, Alexander Limonov, Kabir Malik, and Anoop Singh




This paper examines the impact of unbundling of generation from transmission and distribution on
the operating efficiency of state-owned thermal power plantsin India.  Using information collected
by India’s Central Electricity Authority we construct a panel dataset for thermal power plants for the
years 1994-2008. We take advantage of variation across states in the timing of reforms to examine
the impact of restructuring on plant performance and thermal efficiency. We estimate difference-in-differences
models that control for state-level time trends, and plant and year fixed effects.  The models suggest
that unbundling significantly improved average annual plant availability by about 4.6 percentage points
and reduced forced outages by about 2.9 percentage points in states that unbundled before 2003. Restructuring
has not, however, improved thermal efficiency.  This may reflect the fact that unbundling has not yet
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1.  Introduction 
 
In the decades following independence, the Indian power sector, like the power sector in 
many developing countries, was characterized by inadequate generating capacity, frequent 
blackouts, and high transmission and distribution losses. The thermal efficiency of Indian power 
plants was low, compared to similar plants in high-income countries.
1 Electricity pricing was 
characterized by direct government subsidies, with high tariffs to industry cross-subsidizing low 
tariffs for residential and agricultural consumers. Following nationalization of the power sector 
in 1956, most generating capacity was government-owned. 
 
The first steps towards the reform of the Indian electricity sector were taken two decades 
ago. In 1991, legislation was passed to encourage independent power producers (IPPs) to enter 
the electricity market. This policy was in accordance with the government’s broader macro-
economic liberalization and privatization agenda. However, it failed to substantially increase 
private sector entry into electricity generation and, in 1998, 60% of generation capacity and 
approximately 85% of the transmission and distribution network in India remained under the 
ownership and control of state electricity boards (SEBs). The SEBs operated as vertically 
integrated, regional monopolies. Political interference in pricing and connection decisions were 
commonplace and resulted in large operating losses and the inability to invest in maintenance 
and upgrading of existing infrastructure. Transmission and distribution losses were high—over 
30% of electricity produced—and tariffs covered less than 70% of costs. In addition, the lack of 
transparency and autonomy in operations resulted in inefficiently operated SEB-owned power 
plants: average thermal efficiency was below 30% and average plant load factor below 55%.The 
first SEB reform initiative began in the state of Orissa in the mid-1990s, with the support of the 
World Bank. Following that, the Government of India initiated market-oriented reforms to 
address the underlying causes of the sector’s inefficiency. The Electricity Acts of 1998 and 2003 
led to the creation of a central (national) electricity regulatory commission – the CERC, and 
                                                 
1 It is well established that the thermal efficiency of power plants in developing countries is lower than the thermal 
efficiency of plants in OECD countries (Maruyama and Eckelman 2009).  Persson et al. (2007) report an average 
thermal efficiency of 29 percent for coal-fired Indian plants in 1998. This is lower than the average efficiency 
reported for South Korea and more than 10 percentage points lower than Japan, the most efficient country examined.     
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similar regulatory bodies at the state level – the SERCs. The Acts also paved the way for the 
unbundling of generation, transmission and distribution functions, the privatization of 
distribution companies and the restructuring of the electricity tariff structure, both for end 
consumers and generators. Though there has been variation in the nature and timing of the 
reforms across states, most states have, over the past decade, completed initial reforms. They 
have established independent regulatory commissions, unbundled vertically integrated utilities 
into generation, transmission and distribution companies, corporatized (and in some cases, 
privatized) distribution companies and taken steps towards tariff restructuring. 
Despite more than a decade having passed since the first restructuring reforms, there has 
been no comprehensive study of their impacts on the plants targeted by the reform initiatives. In 
this paper we examine whether these reforms have increased the operating efficiency of state-
owned thermal power plants. Studies of efficiency in electricity generation typically examine 
how far individual plants (or generating units) are from the production frontier (Knittel 2002, 
Shanmugam and Kulshreshtha 2005, Singh 1991), or, they examine variation across plants in 
various performance measures, such as operating heat rate (energy used per kWh) and plant 
availability (percent of the time that the plant is available to generate electricity) (Joskow and 
Schmalensee 1987). In this paper we follow the second approach. Our analysis of performance 
measures focuses on thermal efficiency, which determines fuel costs, and plant reliability. 
Thermal efficiency is measured by operating heat rate—the energy used to generate a kWh of 
electricity—and by deviation of operating from design heat rate. Plant reliability is measured by 
the percent of time that a plant is available to generate electricity—the theoretical maximum 
number of hours less forced outages and planned maintenance. 
We hypothesize that the unbundling of generation from transmission and distribution 
could improve performance in several ways. Separating generation from network functions is 
likely to promote greater autonomy and transparency in operations. Further, it is likely to lead to 
increased responsiveness to price incentives and greater efficiency of resource allocation within a 
plant. Finally, unbundling thermal power plants may improve efficiency by reducing dis-
economies of scope—managers can now focus on decisions related solely to generation, rather 
than considering the system as a whole. This could result in improved plant maintenance, which   
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would increase plant availability and reduce forced outages. Better management could lead to the 
use of imported coal, or coal-washing, which would improve operating heat rate. 
We investigate the impact of unbundling using a panel dataset of thermal power plants 
for the years 1994-2008, which we have constructed using information collected by India’s 
Central Electricity Authority (CEA). We take advantage of the variation across states in the 
timing of reforms to examine the impact of the unbundling of generation from transmission and 
distribution on plant availability and thermal efficiency. Specifically, we estimate difference-in-
differences models for plant availability, forced outages, operating heat rate and other 
performance measures. The models control for the capacity, design heat rate and age of 
generating units in the plant, as well as state-level time trends, and plant and year fixed effects. 
The results from these models suggest that unbundling significantly improved average 
annual plant availability and reduced forced outages in state-owned plants across India. 
Unbundling appears, on average, to have had little impact on operating heat rate. The magnitude 
of these impacts, however, varies significantly across states.The biggest improvements following 
unbundling have occurred primarily in the states in that were among the first to unbundle, i.e., 
those states that unbundled generation from transmission and distribution before the Electricity 
Reform Act of 2003. On average, plant availability increased by approximately 400 hours a year. 
This could represent a duration-of-treatment effect: the impacts of reform take time to be 
realized. Alternatively, it could indicate that states that unbundled earlier differed in unmeasured 
ways from states that unbundled later. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on the Indian power 
sector and on the nature of reforms. Section 3 briefly reviews the recent literature on the 
evaluation of electricity-sector reforms, as well as the literature on generation efficiency in the 
Indian power sector. Our econometric models and data are described in section 4. Section 5 
presents empirical results, and section 6 concludes. 
2.  Institutional Background 
 
Coal-fired power plants currently produce over 75% of the electricity generated in India. 
Ninety percent of the coal-fired generating units in India are sub-critical, with a maximum   
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thermal efficiency of 35-38%. In 1998 the average thermal efficiency of these plants was below 
30%, due in part to technical factors—the high ash and low heat content of Indian coal—and in 
part to inefficiencies in management. The use of coal with low heat content or high ash content 
raises the heat input needed to produce electricity. The heat content of coal used in Indian plants 
in 1990 averaged 4,000 kcal/kg, down from 6,000 kcal/kg in 1960, with ash content between 25 
and 45% (Khanna and Zilberman 1999). This was domestic coal, transported from mines in 
central and east India. Imports of coal with a higher heat and lower ash content were effectively 
prohibited by high tariffs (the tariff on imported coal in 1993 was 85%). Facilities to wash coal 
to reduce its ash content were not widely available in the early 1990s. 
In 1990, 63% of thermal generating capacity was owned by State Electricity Boards 
(SEBs).
2 SEBs operated on soft budgets, with revenue shortfalls made up by state governments. 
Electricity tariffs set by SEBs failed to cover costs, generating capacity expanded slowly in the 
1960s and 1970s, and blackouts were common. There was a need to reform the existing tariff 
structure, which sold electricity cheaply to households and farmers, and compensated by 
charging higher prices to industry. This had prompted firms to generate their own power rather 
than purchasing it from the grid, an outcome that further reduced the revenues of SEBs. The 
result was that most SEBs failed to cover the costs of electricity production. Reform of the 
distribution network was necessary because of the extremely large power losses associated with 
transmission and distribution of electric power, both technical losses and losses due to theft 
(Tongia 2003). 
Beginning in 1991, the Government of India instituted reforms to increase investment in 
power generation, reform the electricity tariff structure, and improve the distribution network. 
Under the Electricity Laws Act of 1991, independent power producers were allowed to invest in 
generating capacity. They were guaranteed a fair rate of return on their investment, with tariffs 
regulated by the Central Electricity Authority. The Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act of 
1998 made it possible for the states to create state electricity regulatory commissions to set 
electricity tariffs. States were to sign Memoranda of Understanding with the federal government 
agreeing to set up SERCs and receiving in return technical assistance to reduce transmission and 
                                                 
2Thirty-three percent of capacity was owned by the central government and 4 percent by private companies. In2006, 
51% of thermal generating capacity was owned by SEBs, 37% by the central government and 12% by private 
companies (CEA 2007).   
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distribution losses, and other benefits. The Electricity Act of 2003 made the establishment of 
state electricity regulatory commissions (SERCs) mandatory and required the unbundling of 
generation, transmission and distribution (Singh 2006). Table 1 shows the year in which the 
SERC became operational in each state and the year in which generation, transmission and 
distribution were unbundled.
3 
Another objective of the 2003 Electricity Act was to reform the electricity tariff 
structure—both for end users and for generators. SERCs are to follow guidelines of the Central 
Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) in compensating generators. The CERC 
compensates the power plants under its jurisdiction based on performance. Compensation for 
energy used in generation is paid based on scheduled generation and depends on operating heat 
rate. Compensation for fixed costs (depreciation, interest on loans and finance charges, return on 
equity, operation and maintenance expenses, interest on working capital, and taxes) is based on 
plant availability. In addition, an Availability Based Tariff was instituted in 2002 to regulate the 
supply of power to the grid. If a generator deviates from scheduled generation, the ABT imposes 
a tariff that depends on system frequency (Chikkatur et al. 2007). 
 
In addition to the electricity reform acts of 1998 and 2003, the tariff on imported coal has 
been lowered, and coal washing has been encouraged. The current duty on imported, non-coking 
coal is 5%. Beginning in 2001, the use of coal with ash content exceeding 34 per cent was 
prohibited in any thermal power plant located more than 1000 km from the pithead, or in urban 
or sensitive or critically polluted areas. The question is what impact these reforms, together with 
the reforms under the Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act of 1998 and the Electricity Act of 
2003, have had on power plant performance. 
  
                                                 
3 Table 1 lists only those states containing thermal power plants.  Our study focuses on coal- and lignite-fueled 
plants.   
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3.  Literature Review 
 
3.1 Studies ofthe Productive Efficiency of Thermal Power Plants 
There is a large literature measuring the productive efficiency of thermal power plants.
4 This 
includes both cross-country studies and studies that compare the efficiency of plants within a 
country. A number of studies measure productive efficiency by comparing the actual amount of 
electricity generated by a plant (Q) to the maximum generation possible, given inputs of capital 
and fuel (Qm). Maximum possible output is calculated from a production frontier, which is 
estimated either by statistical (e.g., stochastic production frontier) or linear programming (e.g., 
Data Envelopment Analysis) methods.In many studies, the technical efficiency (TE) of each 
plant (Q/Qm) is then explained as a function of variables such as the age of the capital stock or 
the nature of plant ownership (e.g., public or private).
5 
Other studies focus on the thermal efficiency of the plant—the amount of fuel used to 
produce a kWh of electricity
6—and other measures of how efficiently a plant is operated. The 
latter include auxiliary consumption—the amount of electricity used for plant operations (i.e., the 
difference between gross and net generation), the percent of time that a plant is available for use 
(plant availability), or the percent of time the plant is actually generating electricity (plant load 
factor). Variation in these measures across plants is often explainedas a function of the vintage of 
capital equipment, average unit capacity, and/or by plant ownership variables. One advantage of 
this approach is that efficiency measures are observed directly, rather than being calculated from 
a production frontier. 
Examples of the first approach in the literature on the Indian electricity sector include 
Singh (1991), Chitkara (1999) and Shanmugam and Kulshreshtha (2005). Singh (1991) uses 
linear programming methods and a cross-section of data from 1986-87 to estimate the technical 
efficiency of state-owned coal-fired power plants. The range of technical efficiency across plants 
is wide, varying from 0.40 to 1.00. When plants are grouped by power sector region (see Table 
                                                 
4 Our review focuses on measures of productive, as opposed to allocative, efficiency. 
5 Other studies allow variables that may explain differences in efficiency to affect the mean of the error term of the 
stochastic frontier (see, e.g., Khanna et al. (1999), Knittel (2002) and Hiebert (2002). 
6 Operating heat rate is defined as the fuel input (in kcal or btu) per kWh of electricity produced.  Thermal efficiency 
is proportional to the power output of the plant, divided by the heating value of the fuel.   
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2), plants in the South are, on average, more efficient than plants in other regions; however, the 
importance of region disappears in a multiple regression.
7 Plants with higher load factors are, as 
expected, more efficient than plants that are used a smaller fraction of the time. 
Shanmugam and Kulshreshtha (2005) estimate a stochastic frontier production model to 
measure the technical efficiency of 56 coal-based power plants for the period 1994-2001. Using 
panel data methods, they test whether technical efficiency parameters changed during the period 
of their analysis.Their results suggest that technical efficiency levels did not vary during this 
period; however, there is considerable variation in technical efficiency across plants (from 0.96 
to 0.46). When technical efficiency is regressed on plant age and region dummies, technical 
efficiency decreases with age and is lower for plants located in the North than in other power 
regions. 
Khanna and Zilberman (1999) use data (1987-88 to 1990-91) for 63 coal-fired power 
plants to analyze the contribution of regulatory and technical factors to plant efficiency. They 
measure efficiency by the heat input required to produce a net kWh of electricity and by 
auxiliary electricity consumption.Efficiency at the EGU-level is explained as a function of 
ownership of the plant (whether state-owned, privately owned or owned by the central 
government), boiler manufacturer, coal quality, age of boiler turbine, and plant load factor. 
Khanna and Zilberman find that energy efficiency increased with the use of coal with higher heat 
content and was lower at plants operated by State Electricity Boards than at private plants, 
holding factors such as plant age and capacity utilization constant. Specifically, they find that 
improving management practices to match those in the private sector could raise average thermal 
efficiency from 25.66 to 26.93 percent; use of high-quality coal could raise it further, to 29.2 
percent.  
Khanna and Zilberman’s study suggests that inefficient operating procedures, lack of 
coal-washing facilities, and high tariffs were, in 1991, barriers to higher thermal efficiency in 
coal-fired power plants. In a subsequent study Khanna and Zilberman (2001) examine whether 
plants would choose to use washed domestic coal if coal-washing facilities were available, or 
would import coal if the tariff on imported coal were lowered from 1991 levels. Assuming that 
                                                 
7 Singh regresses measures of technical efficiency from two linear programming approaches on region dummies, 
plant load factor and plant size (MW of installed capacity).   
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all plants maximize profits, they estimate that, when the tariff on imported coal is reduced to 35 
percent and washed coal is available, 68 percent of units use washed coal, and 18 percent, 
imported coal. These proportions change to 52 percent and 34 percent when the tariff on 
imported coal is reduced to zero. Since the studies by Khanna and Zilberman, the Indian 
government has gradually reduced the tariff on imported coal and has also mandated the use of 
washed coal under certain circumstances (see section 2). An interesting question is whether 
plants in states that unbundled their generation facilities have taken advantage of these policy 
reforms.  
3.2 Studies of Electricity Sector Reforms 
Over the past two decades, many OECD countries and over 70 developing countries have 
taken steps to reform their electricity sectors (Bacon and Besant-Jones 2001; Khanna and Rao 
2009). There is a large literature using cross-country data that examines factors conducive to 
reform and the nature of reforms undertaken (Bacon and Besant-Jones 2001). Studies have also 
examined the impacts of reforms on the efficiency of generation and distribution and on 
electricity pricing (Jamasb et al. 2005). Much of this literature, which is summarized by Jamasb 
et al. (2005) and by Khanna and Rao (2009), focuses on the impact of privatization on 
performance and uses cross-country panel data. Below we discuss studies that examine the 
impact of reforms on generation efficiency using plant-level data. 
Most of the studies that have examined the impact of reforms on generation efficiency 
using plant level data use either stochastic frontier or DEA methods. Jamasb et al. (2005) 
summarize and critique four such studies in developing countries.
8 In the US, Knittel (2002) and 
Hiebert (2002) have used stochastic frontier analysis to study the impact of reforms on 
generation efficiency. Knittel (2002) estimates a stochastic production frontier that allows the 
mean of the efficiency component of the error term to depend on the compensation program that 
the generator faces.
9 He finds greater production efficiency for plants that operate under 
                                                 
8 The studies are Plane (1999), Arocena and Waddams (2002); Hattori (1999) and Delmas and Tokat (2005).  See 
also Pombo and Ramirez (2005). 
9Knittel examines six different programs: compensation based on heat rate, compensation based on an equivalent 
availability factor, price-cap programs, rate-of-return range programs, fuel-cost pass through programs and revenue 
decoupling programs. His sample includes both gas and coal-fired power plants.   
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programs that provide direct incentives for increased efficiency by compensating generators 
based on heat-rate and plant availability (v. plants compensated on a cost-plus basis).  
Hiebert (2002) estimates a stochastic frontier cost function to examine the efficiency 
impacts of unbundling and open access to transmission and generation using US data for the 
period 1988-97. As in Knittel (2002), he jointly estimates the parameters of the stochastic 
frontier and the factors determining the efficiency component of the error term. His analysis 
shows that investor owned utilities and cooperatively owned plants are more efficient than 
publicly owned municipal plants. Hiebert adds dummy variables for states that introduced 
unbundling of generation from transmission and distribution in 1996 and 1997. The results 
indicate efficiency gains in 1996 (but not 1997) for coal-fired plants that were operating in states 
that implemented reforms.  
Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram (2007) study the impact of electricity restructuring on 
generation efficiency in the United States using a difference-in-differences approach to 
measuring efficient input use. Using a plant-level panel (1981-1999) of gas and coal-fired 
thermal power plants, the authors estimate cost-minimizing input demands as a function of plant 
characteristics while controlling for the regulatory regime. They show that privately owned 
utilities in restructuring states experienced greater gains in efficiency of non-fuel input use as 
compared to similar utilities in non-restructuring states and cooperatively or publicly owned 
generators that were insulated from the reforms. Due to the nature of the restructuring process in 
the United States, their restructuring measure combines the effect of unbundling of generation 
from transmission and distribution withopening the generation sector to retail competition. The 
authors, however, attribute most of their impact to the unbundling of generation, as retail 
competition was limited to only 7 states during the period of analysis.  
Although the literature examining the impact of reforms in the Indian electricity is 
growing (e.g., Thakur et al. 2006, Singh 2006, Chikkatur et al. 2007), the only econometric study 
that attempts to estimate ex-post generation efficiency gains is Sen and Jamasb (2010).The 
authors use panel data at the state level for the period 1990-2007 to test the impact of reforms on   
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plant load factor (PLF), gross generation and transmission and distribution losses.
10 Specifically, 
they explain the three performance measures as functions of six regulatory dummy variables and 
state and year fixed effects.
11 They find that the unbundling and tariff order dummy variables 
show a strong positive effect on PLF as does the ratio ofindustrial to agricultural electricity 
prices. They also find that the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC), unbundling and 
privatization dummies have increased transmission and distribution losses, possibly due to the 
reduced ability to hide existing losses after reform. 
In contrast to the state-level approach of Sen and Jamasb (2010), we use data at the plant 
level to examine the effect of unbundling on the performance of state-owned power plants. This 
allows us to control for plant fixed effects, state time trends and year fixed effects. We argue 
that, conditional on these (and other) controls, the unbundling of generation from transmission 
and distribution can reasonably be regarded as exogenous. We also run falsification tests to see 
whether reforms designed to improve the efficiency of state plants also affected centrally-owned 
coal-fired power plants. 
 
4.  Methodology and Questions Addressed 
 
4.1 Questions Addressed 
 
Our goal is to estimate the impact of unbundling of generation, transmission and 
distribution services on generation efficiency at state-owned power plants. Unbundling entails 
corporatizing the sector, which should promote greater autonomy and accountability and increase 
the efficiency with which plants are run. We ask whether this increased the availability of plants 
(e.g., by improving plant maintenance) and also reduced operating heat rate (e.g., by increasing 
imports of high-quality coal). It is also of interest to know whether the effects of unbundling are 
affected by the amount of time that has elapsed since unbundling. 
                                                 
10 The analysis reported is for 245 observations across 18 states and 17 years.  Variables are defined at the state 
level, so the analysis measures the impact of reforms on all power plants—state-owned, privately-owned and 
centrally-owned within a state. 
11 The regulatory dummies are: presence of independent power producers, establishment of a SERC, unbundling of 
generation from transmission and distribution, passing of a tariff order, open access to transmission facilities and 
privatization of distribution.   
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We expect that unbundling of the SEB would increase the transparency and independence 
in the functioning of each newly created entity. Generation efficiency is likely to increase as 
plants will not need to reduce production in response to frequent load variations in transmission 
or distribution networks.
12 Delinking generation from distribution is also likely to improve the 
financial situation of generating plants. This would likely lead to an increased investment in 
maintenance and upgrades of equipment, resulting in better operating efficiency. In addition, a 
vertically integrated SEB may suffer from diseconomies of scope: managerial decisions require 
considering factors affecting the system as a whole. In contrast, an unbundled generation 
company would reduce the scope of managerial decisions and therefore allow focus on efficient 
generation. 
We use two sets of variables to measure the performance of generating plants. The first 
set measures the thermal efficiency of a plant—the heat input required to produce a kWh of 
electricity. We measure this using operating heat rate (kcal of oil and coal per kWh) and also the 
deviation of operating heat rate from design heat rate.We also use coal consumption in kg per 
kWh.
13 The second set of performance measures includes the percent of time a plant is available 
to generate electricity (plant availability) and the percent of time a plant is used to generate 
electricity (plant load factor). In addition to measuring plant availability, we measure the percent 
of time a plant is unavailable for use due to forced outages and the percent of time it is 
unavailable due to planned maintenance.
14 A final measure of plant efficiency is auxiliary 
electricity consumption—the percent of gross generation consumed by the plant itself. 
4.1 Models Estimated 
  
  The variation across states in the timing of the reforms allows us to estimate their impact 
on the performance of thermal power generators using difference-in-differences methods. To 
estimate the average effect of the state-level unbundling reform variable on generating plant 
                                                 
12 After reducing output, increased oil input is required to get the boiler back to the temperature required to produce 
electricity. Increased input use and suboptimal temperature during the cycling up reduces average generation 
efficiency.   
13 This differs from operating heat rate, defined as coal consumption*heating value of coal + oil 
consumption*heating value of oil. 
14 Note that percentage of time available, percentage of time unavailable due to force outages and percentage of time 
unavailable due to planned maintenance sum to 100 percent, by definition.   
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efficiency, weuse a panel difference-in-differences modelwith year and plant-level fixed effects, 
as well as state time trends. The average treatment model takes the following form:  
 
                                             ∑                    ( 1 )  
 
where,      is the plant level performance measure for plant i in state j at time t.      is a vector 
of plant level control variables that measure equipment characteristics (e.g., age, 
capacity).          is the unbundling dummy that takes a value of 1 starting in the year after 
state j unbundles its SEB,      is the plant-level fixed effect,      is the year fixed effect and 
        is the time trend in state j. Standard errors are clustered at the plant level. Inclusion of 
plant fixed effects also controls for time invariant plant-level unobservables that affect the 
generation performance of each plant while time dummies control for the nation-wide macro-
economic conditions or shocks that may affect electricity generation.
15 
  We argue that, by conditioning on plant fixed effects, state time trends and year 
dummies, it is appropriate to treat the timing of unbundling as exogenous. We cannot, however, 
control for state-year shocks. To test whether unbundling could be picking up the effects of state-
specific shocks, we run equation (1) including central government-owned power plants, and 
define an unbundled dummy for these plants = 1 if the state in which the center-owned plant was 
located had unbundled in the year in question. We also estimate equation (1) using only center-
owned coal-fired power plants as a falsification test. 
Equation (1) estimates the average effect of unbundling reform across all states, including 
states that unbundled early (e.g. before 2003) and ones that unbundled later. It is, however, likely 
that the impacts of unbundling take time to occur. To allow for the length of time since 
unbundling to affect various performance measures, we group states into three categories 
according to when unbundling occurred. The first group of states—Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, 
Haryana, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh—had unbundled by 
the year 2002; i.e.,before the Electricity Reform Act of 2003 which required all states to 
                                                 
15Aghion et al. (2008) use a similar procedure to estimate the impact of the dismantling of the licensing regime in 
India on manufacturing output. They take advantage of state/industry variation in industrial policy to estimate a 
difference-in-differences model of the incidence of delicensing on output. Besley and Burgess (2004) conduct a 
state-level panel analysis estimating the effect of labor regulation on state output per capita.   
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unbundle. The second group of states (Assam, Gujarat, Maharashtra and West Bengal) 
unbundled between 2004 and 2007. The last group of states (Bihar, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, 
Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand) unbundled only in 2008 or later. 
To estimate the impact of duration of treatment (length of time since unbundling) on our 
performance measures, we interact the unbundled variables with dummyvariables that indicate 
when a state unbundled,  
                           ∑                  ∑               .   (2) 
 
In equation (2)   represents the impact of unbundling at time k (k = unbundled first, unbundled 
second) relative to not having unbundled within the timeframe of our panel. Equation (2) is also 






Data on the operating characteristics of thermal power plants were obtainedfrom publicly 
available documents published by the Central Electricity Authority of India (CEA).
17 We used 
these reports to construct an unbalanced panel of 82 thermal power plants, located in 17 states, 
for the years 1994-2008.
18 The dataset includes 59 state-owned and 23 central-government-
owned plants. The plants in our dataset constitute75 per cent of the total installed generation 
capacity in the country in the year 2007-08.
19 The dates of establishment of the SERCs and of the 
unbundling of state utilities were obtained from the websites of the individual SERCs.  
 
Table 3 presents summary statistics on key variables for state and center-owned plants at 
the beginning (1994-98) and at the end of our panel (2006-08).
20 Variable means are reported 
                                                 
16 Due to the smaller number of central plants (23 plants) we do not distinguish central plants by the time period 
during which the state in which they were located unbundled.  
17 The CEA annually publishes the Thermal Power Review which describes the operating characteristics of all state- 
operated thermal power plants in India, and provides some data on central-government-owned and privately-owned 
plants. 
18 All years in our dataset are Indian fiscal years.  Thus 1994 refers to the time period April 1, 1994 through March 
30, 1995.   
19 Our dataset includes all state-owned plants, but not all private and central government owned plants.  
20 Central plants are plants operated by the central government, including National Thermal Power Corporation 
(NTPC) plants.     
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both weighted and unweighted by plant capacity. Central plants are, on average, larger than state 
plants. Over the years 1994-98, the average plant load factor at center-owned plants was 
significantly higher than at state plants, although there is no statistically significant difference in 
average plant availability or in coal consumption per kWh.
21 Comparison of operating heat rate 
between state and center plants is difficult, as data are often missing for plants operated by the 
National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC). To put the thermal efficiency of state plants in 
perspective, the average operating heat rate of state plants in 1994-98 (2864 kcal/kWh, capacity 
weighted) was 20% higher than the average operating heat rate of subcritical plants in the US 
during the period 1960-1980 (Joskow and Schmalensee 1987). 
Between 1994 and 2008 both state and central plants improved in reliability (plant 
availability and plant load factor) and thermal efficiency; however, the average reduction in coal 
usage per kWh at state-owned plants was not statistically significant, whereas it was at central 
plants. Table 3 indicates that both sets of plants have experience large gains in plant load factors 
(an average increase of 16 percentage points for central and 12 percentage points for state plants, 
capacity-weighted) and smaller, but significant gains in plant availability (an average increase of 
6.4 percentage points for central and 5.8 percentage points for state plants, capacity-
weighted).
22Average coal consumption per kWh remained approximately constant for state 
plants (from 0.78 to 0.77 kg/kWh, capacity-weighted) while decreasing at central plants (from 
0.73 to 0.70 kg/kWh).
23 
Table 4 presents more detailed information on state-owned plants, grouped by when 
reforms occurred. Plants that unbundled before the Electricity Act of 2003 are not significantly 
different from states that unbundled between 2004 and 2007 in terms of plant availability and 
plant load factor during the 1994-98 period. They are, however, less thermally efficient than 
plants that unbundled later, both in terms of coal consumption per kWh and operating heat rate. 
Plants in states that unbundled first have (on average) significantly greater availability and load 
                                                 
21 Means tests are based on unweighted means.  Operating heat rate data are frequently missing for central plants; 
however, operating heat rate does not differ significantly between state and central plants based on reported data. 
22 The unweighted means show much larger gains for central plants than for state plants:  20 percentage points v. 10 
points for plant load factor and 9 v. 3.3 points for plant availability. 
23 The changes in unweighted means are 0.79 to 0.71 kg/kWh for central plants and 0.81 to 0.79 kg/kWh for state 
plants.   
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factors than plants in states that unbundled in 2008 or later. There is, however, no significant 
difference in operating heat rates or coal consumption per kWh between the two sets of plants. 
4.4 Trends in Plant Performance and Thermal Efficiency 
Before turning to our econometric results, we discuss trends in performance measures 
and in the thermal efficiency of plants in states that unbundled. Figure 1 shows how plant 
availability, forced outage and planned maintenance changed before and after unbundling at 
state-owned plants in states that unbundled. In Panel A of Figure 1 both plant availability and 
forced outages show no apparent trends prior to unbundling; however, availability increased and 
forced outages decreased following unbundling. In contrast, planned maintenance shows no 
apparent trend prior to unbundling and a downward, but highly volatile pattern, after unbundling. 
Panel B indicates that the plants in states that unbundled before 2003 exhibit similar 
patterns in availability and forced outages following unbundling. Further, the graphs also suggest 
that improvements materialize a few years after unbundling (especially the graphs for 
availability). Since we have, at most, 3 years of data available for states that unbundled after 
2003 we cannot capture improvements that may occur in subsequent years. Figure 2, showing 
corresponding trends at center-owned power plants, suggests that availability increased and 
forced outages decreased at center-owned plants before the states in which they were located 
unbundled. These trends continued after unbundling, suggesting that unbundling had no effect on 
center-owned plants. 
The two measures of thermal efficiency pictured in Figure 3 for state-owned plants that 
unbundled—operating heat rate and auxiliary power consumption—present a mixed picture. 
Auxiliary power consumption does not appear to have improved following unbundling in either 
Panel A (which shows results for all power plants) or Panel B, which distinguishes plants by 
when unbundling occurred. Plants that unbundled before 2003 have experienced lower operating 
heat rates since unbundling; however, attributing this effect to unbundling requires that we 
control for state time trends and compare the behavior of plants in states that unbundled with 
plants in states than did not. 
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5.  Results 
Our empirical results reflect two sets of comparisons: First, we compare state plants in 
states that unbundled with state plants in states that did not unbundle (equations (1) and (2)). 
Second, we compare state plants in states that unbundled with state plants in states that did not 
unbundle and with central plants. In the second case a dummy variable is included if a central 
plant is located in an unbundled state. We also estimate equation (1) using data for only central 
plants as a falsification test, since unbundling was designed to affect only state-owned plants. 
 
5.1 Impact of Unbundling on Thermal Efficiency 
To examine the impact of unbundling on thermal efficiency we estimate equations to 
explain the logarithm of operating heat rate, the deviation of operating heat rate from design heat 
rate and the logarithm of coal consumption per kWh. At the generating unit level the amount of 
fuel required to produce a kWh of electricity should depend on the unit’s design heat rate, the 
quality of coal used and the age of the unit (Joskow and Schmalensee 1987). Units with higher 
design heat rates will burn more coal per kWh than units with lower design heat rate, and coal 
with a higher heating value can be burned more efficiently than coal with a lower heating value. 
Generally speaking, unit performance should deteriorate with age, although performance may 
actually improve after the first few years of operation. Increasing boiler size should reduce coal 
required per kWh, up to some point. Also, units with higher load factors and fewer forced 
outages will burn less coal due to the fact that they need to be shut down and started up less 
often.
24 We control for all of these variables in the coal consumption per kWh and operating heat 
rate equations, and control for all factors except design heat rate in the equation to explain the 
deviation of operating from design heat rate.
25 
  Table 5 presents least squares estimates of equations (1) and (2) for the three thermal 
efficiency variables.
26 As expected, thermal efficiency declines with plant age and is higher at 
                                                 
24 Clearly plant load factor and coal consumption are jointly determined, but, as noted by Joskow and Schmalensee 
(1987), load factor is the best proxy for the way a unit is operated to increase thermal efficiency.  
25 Because our models are estimated at the plant level, variables measured at the generating unit level (such as age) 
have been aggregated to the plant level by weighting each unit by its nameplate capacity. 
26 Standard errors are clustered at the plant level.  Robust p-values are reported based on clustered standard errors.   
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plants with larger generating units. Plants with higher load factors have lower operating heat 
rates and lower deviations of operating from design heat rate. Coal of lower heating value 
increases the amount of coal burned to generate a kWh of electricity. Operating heat rate 
increases with the heating value of coal, implying that the reduction in kg of coal used does not 
fully offset the increased heating value of the coal. 
In contrast to Figure 3, Table 5 suggests that unbundling did not improve the thermal 
efficiency of power plants. Average treatment effects in models (1) – (3) show no significant 
impact of unbundling. In models (4) – (6), which distinguish effects by length of time unbundled, 
there is no impact of unbundling on thermal efficiency for plants in states that unbundled before 
the Electricity Reform Act of 2003. For plants that unbundled between 2004 and 2007, thermal 
efficiency actually decreased after unbundling. The states that were in the middle group of 
reformers include Assam, Gujarat, Maharashtra and West Bengal. Based on raw data, coal 
consumption per kWh increased in Gujarat, Maharashtra and West Bengal between 1994 and 
2008.
27 These increases persist in Table 5. One possible explanation for these results is the 
presence of newly installed, unstabilized units, due to expansion of capacity in these states. 
  Due to missing data on thermal efficiency for center-owned power plants, we do not 
present falsification tests for the models in Table 5. As noted above, data on operating heat rate 
are often missing for NTPC plants. 
5.2 Impact of Unbundling on Other Performance Measures 
Table 6 reports least squares estimates of models for other performance measures—plant 
availability, plant load factor, forced outage, planned maintenance and gross consumption of 
electricity by the plant (gross auxiliary consumption). These models control for plant age, plant 
age squared and average unit capacity, as well as state time trends and plant and year fixed 
effects. 
The average treatment effects of unbundling (models (1) – (5)) suggest that unbundling is 
associated with a small, statistically significant effect on plant availability. Models (6) – (10) 
suggest that this occurred primarily in the states that unbundled before the Electricity Reform 
                                                 
27 Data for Assam are missing after 2004.   
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Act of 2003. Model (6) indicates that availability increased, on average, by 4.6 percentage points 
(400 hours) at plants in those states. Forced outage decreased by 2.9 percentage points (250 
hours), although this effect is significant at only the 10 percent level. 
The impact of unbundling on plant availability persists when state plants are compared 
with central plants, as well as with state plants that did not unbundle during our panel. The 
models in Table 7 estimate the average impact of unbundling on state plants, including an 
unbundling dummy for center plants in years after the state in which the plant is located 
unbundled. We expect to see no impact of unbundling on center-owned plants: A significant 
coefficient on the unbundled dummy for center plants suggests that unbundling might be 
capturing the effect of state-year shocks rather than the effect of restructuring per se
28.  
The impact of unbundling on state plants in early unbundling states is unaffected by 
including central plants in the models. For states that unbundled before 2003, unbundling is 
associated with 4.2 percentage point increase in plant availability (360 hours) and a 2.8 
percentage point decrease in forced outages (models (6) and (8) of Table 7a). In these models, 
however, unbundling by state plants is associated with a decrease in forced outages at central 
plants and an increase in planned maintenance (models (8) and (9)). 
The apparent impact of unbundling on center-owned plants is due entirely to opening of 
the Talcher STPS plant in Orissa in 1996. This plant, which opened the year that Orissa 
unbundled, was an extremely efficient plant and makes it appear that center-owned plants 
became more efficient after unbundling. When the one state-owned and two center-owned plants 
in Orissa are dropped from our sample (see Table 7b), unbundling has no statistically significant 
effect on the performance of center-owned plants.  
Similar results occur in Tables 8a and 8b, which present equation (1) for only center-
owned plants. The apparent impact of unbundling on the performance of center-owned plants in 
Table 8a disappears once plants in Orissa are dropped. We therefore conclude that (as expected) 
the unbundling of state-owned plants did not affect the efficiency with which central plants were 
operated. 
                                                 
28 It is possible that there are indirect effects of systemic changes due to unbundling in state electricity markets on 
the operation of center-owned power plants. This is something we leave for future research.   
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6.  Conclusions 
Our results suggest that the unbundling of generation from transmission and distribution 
at state power plants in India resulted in modest but significant gains in plant availability. These 
effects are more pronounced among the first group of states to unbundle—i.e., states that 
unbundled between 1996 and 2002. Whether these improvement are due to reductions in forced 
outages is less clear, although reductions in forced outage are statistically significant in some 
models. We find improvements in availability when we compare plants in states that unbundled 
with plants in states that did not unbundle, and also when we compare them to plants operated by 
the central government. The magnitude of increases in plant availability range from 2.8 to 4.7 
percentage points (258 to 411 hours per year). We do not find statistically significant 
improvements in the thermal efficiency of plants in states that unbundled. 
Our results are consistent with results obtained by Fabrizio et al. (2007) in a study of the 
impact of restructuring on generation efficiency in the U.S., but differ from those of Sen and 
Jamasb (2010). Fabrizio et al. (2007) do not find significant impacts of restructuring in the U.S. 
on the thermal efficiency of plants, although they do find significant impacts on labor demand. 
Sen and Jamasb (2010) find that unbundling increased average plant load factors by 26 
percentage points in states that unbundled—an extremely large effect. Raw data plots similar to 
those in Figures 1-3 show that plant load factors increased after unbundling at both state and 
center-owned plants; however, these impacts are not statistically significant once we control for 
time fixed effects and state time trends. 
Our failure to find a larger impact from restructuring than reported above may reflect the 
path that reform has taken in India thus far. As Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001) emphasize, 
separating generation from transmission and distribution is likely to be most successful when it is 
accompanied by tariff reform and when it induces competition in generation. Tariff reform that 
promotes cost recovery in the electricity sector is needed in order to make generation profitable. 
Although tariff reform has begun, in 2006 only 3 of the 10 states that had unbundled before this 
date were making positive profits (TERI 2009, Table 1.80). One way in which unbundling is 
likely to encourage competition is by encouraging independent power producers to enter the   
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market. This followed restructuring of the electricity sector in the U.S., but has not yet taken hold 
on a large scale in India. 
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Table 2: Indian Power Sector Regions Prior to Reform 
NORTH  EAST  WEST  SOUTH  NORTH‐EAST 
Delhi  Bihar  Chhattisgarh  Andhra Pradesh  Assam 
Haryana  Jharkhand  Gujarat  Karnataka    
Punjab  Orissa  Madhya Pradesh  Tamil Nadu    
Rajasthan  West Bengal  Maharashtra       
Uttar Pradesh             
 
  
Table 3:Variable Means, Center and State Plants 
CENTER  STATE 
1994‐1998  1994‐1998 
   N  Mean (w.)  Mean  Std. dev.  Obs.  Mean (w.)  Mean  Std. dev. 
# of operating units  93    4.53  2.12  251    4.05 2.18 
net generation* (GWH)  92    5270  4629  242    2927 2679 
derated capacity *(MW)  96    922  613  253    601 447 
forced outage (%)  93 10.7 14.3  13.0  251 12.3 13.4 9.95 
planned maintenance* (%)  93 8.0 9.6  9.5  251 12.1 13.7 13.0 
availability (%)  93 81.4 76.1  16.2  251 75.7 72.9 17.9 
plant load factor* (%)  93 69.0 61.4  21.2  251 59.6 54.5 20.0 
design heat rate (KCal/KWH)  12 2532 2520  148  89 2414 2472 183 
operating heat rate (KCal/KWH)  14 3133 3283  496  88 2864 3106 659 
specific coal cons. (Kg/KWH)  76 0.731 0.795  0.359  226 0.779 0.809 0.201 
aux. cons.* (% gross gen.)  92 7.92 8.33  1.22  242 8.76 9.21 1.32 
net thermal efficiency  14 0.256 0.243  0.037  88 0.282 0.262 0.049 
Age  96 11.0 13.2  10.6  253 13.2 15.1 8.28 
average unit capacity* (MW)  96 262 219  120  253 175 138 71 
   2006‐2008  2006‐2008 
# of operating units*  64    5.03  2.13  166    4.07 2.20 
net generation* (GWH)  64    8977  6641  166    3994 3426 
derated capacity* (MW)  65    1295  843  169    687 494 
forced outage* (%)  65 6.7 9.2  16.1  169 10.1 14.2 16.5 
planned maintenance* (%)  65 5.6 5.6  3.1  169 8.5 9.7 15.5 
availability* (%)  65 87.8 85.1  15.4  169 81.4 76.2 22.6 
plant load factor* (%)  65 85.1 81.1  18.1  169 71.5 64.8 24.9 
design heat rate* (KCal/KWH)  17 2523 2504  140  111 2357 2408 179 
operating heat rate* (KCal/KWH)  17 3127 3159  397  111 2752 2878 460 
specific coal cons.* (Kg/KWH)  55 0.700 0.710  0.067  135 0.773 0.791 0.124 
aux. cons.* (% gross gen.)  64 6.81 7.59  1.67  166 8.71 9.39 2.09 
net thermal efficiency*  17 0.253 0.251  0.030  111 0.291 0.278 0.043 
age*  65 15.5 17.8  10.8  169 20.4 22.0 10.8 




Table 4: Variables Means, State Plants, by Time of Unbundling 
   EARLY MIDDLE  LATE
   1994‐1998 1994‐1998  1994‐1998
   Obs.  Mean (w.) Mean Std. dev. Obs. Mean (w.)  Mean Std. dev. Obs. Mean (w.) Mean Std. dev.
# of operating units  119  3.88 2.60 85 4.18 1.70 47 4.23 1.72
net generation (GWH)  113  2657 2742 85 3281 2715.76 44 2937 2411
derated capacity* (MW)  119  531 457 85 686 475.59 49 622 340
forced outage (%)  119  13.2 13.5 9.68 85 10.7  11.62 6.61 47 13.2 16.4 14.22
planned maintenance (%)  119  12.0 13.3 12.8 85 10.5  12.8 12.25 47 15.1 16.5 14.6
availability (%)  119  74.8 73.2 17.5 85 78.7  75.6 15.63 47 71.7 67.1 21.6
plant load factor (%)  119  61.1 56.4 18.9 85 60.0  54.8 18.29 47 55.6 49.4 24.5
design heat rate*^ (KCal/KWH)  44  2469 2521 209 31 2374  2430 153.58 14 2371 2412 107
operating heat rate* (KCal/KWH)  42  2969 3247 683 32 2763  2932 543.43 14 2861 3079 771
specific coal cons.* (Kg/KWH)  99  0.815 0.858 0.262 80 0.736  0.732 0.09 47 0.791 0.837 0.143
aux. cons.* (% gross gen.)  113  8.96 9.43 1.32 85 8.61  8.90 0.95 44 8.62 9.22 1.80
net thermal efficiency*  42  0.273 0.251 0.050 32 0.290  0.274 0.04 14 0.283 0.267 0.052
age^  119  13.21 16.17 9.17 85 13.65  14.96 7.22 49 12.32 12.71 7.33
average unit capacity*^ (MW)  119  168 126 76.3 85 187  147.8 65.89 49 166 150 60.1
   2006‐2008 2006‐2008  2006‐2008
# of operating units^  65  4.46 2.65 58 4.17 1.97 43 3.35 1.53
net generation (GWH)  65  4426 3797 58 4045 3433.07 43 3275 2705
derated capacity^ (MW)  65  747 549 60 705 529.85 44 574 320
forced outage (%)  65  7.94 12.8 12.81 60 12.3  17.36 20.88 44 10.5 11.7 14.11
planned maintenance*^ (%)  65  7.48 7.94 7.14 60 6.19  5.51 4.30 44 14.4 17.9 27.3
availability (%)  65  84.6 79.2 15.4 60 81.6  77.1 19.81 44 75.0 70.4 32.4
plant load factor (%)  65  74.6 66.1 22.7 60 69.0  63.7 20.41 44 69.6 64.1 32.8
design heat rate (KCal/KWH)  40  2349 2403 185 45 2371  2438 203.77 26 2348 2363 100
operating heat rate (KCal/KWH)  41  2717 2902 631 44 2840  2954 309.04 26 2668 2710 300
specific coal cons.* (Kg/KWH)  57  0.779 0.819 0.127 45 0.776  0.772 0.09 33 0.756 0.770 0.154
aux. cons.*^ (% gross gen.)  65  8.87 9.99 2.31 58 8.62  9.17 1.52 43 8.55 8.77 2.23
net thermal efficiency  41  0.296 0.280 0.055 44 0.279  0.267 0.03 26 0.299 0.294 0.033
Age  65  18.45 21.81 11.25 60 21.54  21.46 11.00 44 22.13 22.96 9.82
average unit capacity (MW)  65  187 148 76.0 59 196  160 69.5 44 173 156 63.8
* different at the 5% level between MIDDLE and EARLY according to a two‐sample t‐test w. unequal variances; ^  different between LATE and EARLY
Early (Pre-2003): ANDHRA PRADESH, HARYANA, KARNATAKA, ORISSA, RAJASTHAN, UTTAR PRADESH, DELHI and MADHYA PRADESH 
Middle (Post-2003): GUJARAT, MAHARASHTRA, WEST BENGAL and ASSAM 
Late (Out-of-sample): BIHAR, PUNJAB, TAMIL NADU, CHATTISGARH and JHARKHAND  
Table 5: Impact of Unbundling on Thermal Efficiency of State Owned Coal-fired Power Plants 



















          
Log(Design  Heat  rate)    0.397* 0.412*    0.393* 0.407* 
   (0.0907)  (0.0611)    (0.0872)  (0.0579) 
Log(Heating Value of Coal)  0.449***  0.343***  -0.634***  0.459***  0.350***  -0.626*** 
 (0.000212)  (5.73e-05)  (3.69e-10)  (0.000157) (4.01e-05)  (4.62e-10) 
Plant  Age  0.00879  0.00830* 0.0101** 0.00816 0.00789 0.00972** 
 (0.174)  (0.0863)  (0.0293)  (0.210)  (0.105)  (0.0373) 
Plant Age Squared  0.000140  9.79e-05  4.88e-05  0.000149  0.000103  5.45e-05 
 (0.133)  (0.171)  (0.482)  (0.109)  (0.146)  (0.429) 
Average Unit Capacity  -0.00191*  -0.00157*  -0.00157**  -0.00205*  -0.00167**  -0.00167** 
 (0.0933)  (0.0589)  (0.0426)  (0.0740)  (0.0487)  (0.0351) 
Forced Outage  0.000469  6.68e-05  3.61e-05  0.000431  4.01e-05  8.86e-06 
 (0.689)  (0.933)  (0.963)  (0.717)  (0.960)  (0.991) 
Plant Load Factor  -0.00111*  -0.000988**  -0.000562  -0.00105  -0.000950**  -0.000524 
 (0.0904)  (0.0419)  (0.206)  (0.105)  (0.0478)  (0.232) 
 0.0101  0.0146  0.0201       
Unbundled (0.545)  (0.249)  (0.104)       
       -0.0173  -0.00378  0.00127 
Unbundled before 2003        (0.573)  (0.863)  (0.952) 
       0.0452*  0.0381*  0.0441** 
Unbundled after 2003        (0.0700)  (0.0557)  (0.0301) 
          
Observations  376  376 376 376  376 376 
R-squared  0.942  0.965 0.945 0.943  0.966 0.946 
Robust pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All equations control for year and plant fixed effects and state time trends 
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Table 6: Impact of Unbundling on Performance of State Owned Coal-fired Power Plants 

























                   
Unbundled 2.748*  0.861  -1.563 -1.185  0.157           
 (0.0806)  (0.657)  (0.242) (0.249)  (0.558)           
Unbundled           4.588**  3.152  -2.894* -1.696  0.203 
before 2003            (0.0149)  (0.160) (0.0920) (0.405)  (0.615) 
Unbundled             0.226  -2.279 0.261  -0.484  0.0952 
after 2003            (0.946)  (0.507) (0.930)  (0.853)  (0.817) 
                   
Observations  786 786  786  786  776  786 786  786  786  776 
R-squared  0.801 0.877  0.656  0.518  0.500  0.802 0.878  0.657  0.518  0.500 
Robust p-values in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7a: Impact of Unbundling on Performance Measures: State and Center Owned Coal-fired Power Plants 

























                    
Unbundled 
(State plants) 
3.261** -0.185  -1.671  -1.590*  0.361           
(0.0330) (0.92)  (0.180)  (0.0807)  (0.135)           
Unbundled 
before 2003 
        4.207**  0.550  -2.736*  -1.472  0.454 
         (0.0312)  (0.818)  (0.0882) (0.318)  (0.172) 
Unbundled 
after 2003 
         1.739  -1.368  0.0415  -1.779  0.212 




1.531  3.057  -5.137*  3.606* -0.0187 2.025  3.441  -5.693*  3.667* 0.0299 
(0.629) (0.404
) 
(0.0825) (0.0839) (0.932) (0.511)  (0.330) (0.0532) (0.0945) (0.906) 
Observations 1,085 1,085  1,085  1,085  1,074  1,085  1,085  1,085  1,085  1,074 
R-squared 0.792  0.870  0.679  0.492  0.549  0.793  0.870  0.679  0.492  0.549 
Robust p-values in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7b:Impact of Unbundling on Performance Measures: State and Center Owned Coal-fired Power Plants (w/o Orissa) 

























                 
Unbundled 
(State plants) 
3.110** -0.186  -1.424 -1.686*  0.365           
(0.0456) (0.925)  (0.261) (0.0776)  (0.145)           
Unbundled 
before 2003 
        4.123**  0.795  -2.489 -1.634  0.456 
        (0.0417)  (0.753) (0.133) (0.299)  (0.199) 
Unbundled 
after 2003 
       1.572  -1.676 0.193  -1.764  0.229 




-0.264  1.178 -3.130 3.394  -0.118  0.290  1.714 -3.713 3.422  -0.0692 
(0.934) (0.751)  (0.254) (0.136)  (0.601)  (0.924) (0.631) (0.171) (0.152)  (0.796) 
                 
Observations  1,044 1,044  1,044 1,044  1,033  1,044 1,044  1,044 1,044  1,033 
R-squared  0.794 0.871  0.680 0.494  0.562  0.794 0.872  0.680 0.494  0.562 
Robust p-values in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All equations control for plant age, plant age squared, average capacity, year and plant fixed effects and state time trends. 
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Table 8a:Impact of Unbundling on Performance Measures: Center Owned Coal-fired Power Plants 









        
Unbundled (Center plants)  3.379  0.704  -5.033*  1.654  0.542* 
(0.218)  (0.845) (0.0961) (0.245) (0.0923) 
        
Observations  299  299 299 299 298 
R-squared  0.795  0.870 0.762 0.347 0.681 
Robust p-values in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






Table 8b:Impact of Unbundling on Performance Measures: Center Owned Coal-fired Power Plants (w/o Orissa) 









        
Unbundled (Center plants)  1.195  -1.614  -2.293  1.098  0.515 
(0.598) (0.653) (0.346) (0.542)  (0.143) 
        
Observations  272 272 272 272  271 
R-squared  0.801 0.865 0.768 0.357  0.671 
Robust p-values in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All equations control for plant age, plant age squared, average capacity, year and plant fixed effects and state time trends. 
 
  
Figure 1: Trends in Performance Measures at State-Owned Plants in States that Unbundled 
Panel A: All States that unbundled 
 




1.  The X-axis represents year that have been normalized around the year in which unbundling law was enacted in that 
particular state. 
2.  States that unbundled before 2003 are Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Karnataka, Orissa, Rajasthan, Delhi and Madhya 
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Figure 3: Trends in Thermal Efficiency at State-Owned Plants in States that Unbundled 
 
 











1.  The X-axis has been normalized so that year 0 is the year in which unbundling occurred. 
2.  States that unbundled before 2003 are Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Karnataka, Orissa, Rajasthan, Delhi and Madhya 
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